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Highlights
• At the extraordinary European Council of 21 July European leaders should first
pave the way to restoring solvency in Greece by initiating debt reduction. This
implies: i) reducing the interest rate on official lending, ii) requesting from the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) support for an immediate bond
buy-back programme, and iii) asking the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB) for an immediate evaluation of the risks to financial stability involved
in a future restructuring of sovereign debt in the euro area.
• Second, immediate growth-enhancing measures should be financed through
unused European Union Structural Funds and European Investment Bank
loans (€16 billion), which should be used to: i) raise the quality of higher edu-
cation, ii) finance wage subsidies in manufacturing and tourism to generate
an internal devaluation while containing domestic-demand costs; and iii)
create research laboratories to underpin an upgrading of Greece’s value chain.
• Third, risks to financial stability in the euro area should be addressed by brea-
king the vicious circle of sovereign debt and banking risk. The EFSF should be
able to guarantee national deposit insurance schemes; at the same time, the
European Banking Authority should assume stronger supervisory powers.
• This is an immediate action plan. More ambitious reform should follow.
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1. See the evidence in
Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and
Sapir (2011) and, for an
update, Darvas (2011).
‘Greece is insolvent. Any policy measure needs to start from the fact that under plausible
economic, financial and political assumptions it will be impossible for the Greek government to
generate and sustain the primary budget surplus necessary to achieve solvency.’
We estimate that a viable solution to deal with Greece
should result in reducing the net present value (NPV)
of future debt obligations by at least a third.
Though European leaders should recognise this
reality, they, the European institutions and finan-
cial markets remain unprepared for a significant
debt restructuring at the expense of private
investors. Preparatory work to ensure the recapi-
talisation of banks heavily exposed to sovereign
risk – first and foremost the Greek banks – and
for mitigating threats to financial stability is in its
infancy. While more informative and credible than
those conducted a year ago, the European Bank-
ing Authority's recent stress tests have not helped
in this regard because the possibility of sovereign
default has not been considered. Moreover, a
restructuring at this stage, especially if hastily
prepared, could lead to further increases in
spreads in other euro-area countries. Finally, the
European Central Bank remains adamantly
opposed to debt restructuring and it is threaten-
ing to cut off the Greek banking system from
access to liquidity. 
After the trauma of the global financial crisis, and
with some banks in a still-precarious state, it is
crucial for the euro area to avoid a precipitous and
disorderly default. European leaders have no
choice but to postpone the eventual launch of a
restructuring process. This would also give time
to enact much-needed reforms in other countries.
For example, the Spanish government has
committed to the consolidation of its savings
banks (Cajas) by September 2011; and measures
to strengthen the fiscal framework and improve
the functioning of labour markets are part of the
necessary Spanish agenda.
THE GREEK CRISIS is only one aspect of a broader
set of issues that the leaders of the euro area need
to address urgently to stop the escalation of
market turbulence. But Greece has become, in the
eyes of market participants and citizens, the
litmus test of the EU’s ability to solve its problems.
By acting effectively over Greece, the euro area
would demonstrate that it can address the prob-
lems assailing Europe.     
The extraordinary meeting of European leaders on
21 July should map out the EU's strategy for
responding to this crisis, starting with the restora-
tion of Greece's solvency. The response to imme-
diate concerns about sovereign debt must be
combined with a credible growth strategy. Finally,
leaders should address broader systemic euro-
area fragilities.
1 PAVE THE WAY TOWARDS RESTORING GREEK
SOLVENCY
Greece is insolvent. Any policy measure needs to
start from the fact that under plausible economic,
financial and political assumptions it will be
impossible for the Greek government to generate
and sustain the primary budget surplus neces-
sary to achieve solvency. It would be irresponsi-
ble to assume that Greece could generate such a
huge surplus, as this eventuality rests on a series
of low-probability developments1. Generating a
surplus would be difficult for any country grap-
pling with excessive debt, but is even more so for
a country that is unable to use the exchange rate
as a policy tool because it is member of a mone-
tary union, and has to undergo an internal deval-
uation to restore competitiveness and foster
sustainable growth.
This state of affairs implies that euro-area gov-
ernments can be expected to agree on additional
official finance for Greece, for a long enough period
to cover its financing needs until it is able to
borrow on financial markets – the so-called
second programme. At current interest rates, how-
ever, this lending would further endanger sustain-
ability, it would soon lead to a level of interest
payments to foreign official creditors that would
be unacceptable to the Greeks and could thus fur-
ther undermine political stability. Euro-area lead-
ers could therefore agree on a significant
reduction of the interest rate charged on official
loans. 
This option raises a number of issues that leaders
will need to sort out. First, EFSF support provided
within the framework of a second programme can
– and should – be provided at the interest rate at
which the EFSF itself can borrow on the market,
plus a small margin to cover the operational cost.
Indeed other non euro-area countries receiving
assistance (Hungary, Latvia, and Romania)
receive lending at European borrowing rates plus
a small operational surcharge. But lowering the
interest rate to a level close to the German Bund
rate will be perceived as unfair by other euro-area
countries, including Spain and Italy, which need
to pay higher rates on the debt they issue to
finance bilateral loans. Because of equal treat-
ment, this option will also have to be applied to the
euro area's two other programme countries, Ire-
land and Portugal. Second,the German govern-
ment will have to clear ex ante if such a step would
be compatible with rulings of the German consti-
tutional court. So far, delivering assistance at a
significant fee, thus making it compatible with the
'no-bail-out clause'2, has been an important argu-
ment for the German government. Third, taxpay-
ers could legitimately question the provision of
subsidised loans to Greece, especially in the
absence of private-sector involvement. 
The need to avoid the burden of adjustment falling
on taxpayers in full is a justification to seek polit-
ical agreement that any future cost resulting from
assistance to Greece (whether this takes the form
of a loan provided at favourable rates or eventual
debt forgiveness) would be entirely covered by an
exceptional levy on financial institutions. The levy
could be proportionally reduced for institutions
2. Article 103 of the Treaty
states in fact that
responsability for repaying
the public debt rests with
the debtor, and no other
monetary union member
shall be considered liable
for the commitments of
other countries.
3. See Wolff (2011).
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that are taking part in domestic or cross-border
mergers and acquisitions indeed with the purpose
of reinforcing their own capital ratios. 
Furthermore, any new financing programme
implies a reduction in the exposure of the finan-
cial system to Greece, thereby shifting more of the
burden of an eventual restructuring onto the offi-
cial creditors. There is therefore a need to keep the
private sector on board as much as possible. But
ambiguity remains on what this means. European
banks remain divided on the exact shape and form
of such a solution. Some remain reluctant to
recognise that roll-overs will not be sufficient and
that significant reductions in the net present
value of future repayments are necessary to
restore Greece's solvency.  
European leaders should start applying moral
pressure to create the necessary incentives for
private-sector participation. To signal the need for
debt reduction, and support for it, the leaders
should request EFSF support for an immediate
bond buy-back programme. The programme, of
limited size (say, €50 billion), would crystallise
immediate losses and achieve some limited debt
reduction (of about 10 percent of GDP at most).
By itself, such a move would not suffice to change
the debt equation materially, but would hopefully
open the way to more ambitious initiatives. In the
short term the EFSF could lend to the Greek gov-
ernment to finance buybacks, but it would be
desirable to reopen the EFSF (and European Sta-
bility Mechanism) package to include the possi-
bility of purchases on the secondary market.  
Notwithstanding these steps, a comprehensive
debt restructuring programme needs to be
urgently planned and prepared. To this end lead-
ers should also request from the ESRB, whose role
is to contribute to the ‘prevention or mitigation of
systemic risks to financial stability’, an immedi-
ate evaluation of the risks to financial stability
involved in a future restructuring of sovereign
debt in the euro area, and proposals for mitigating
the risks3.
Summing up, the European leaders are not in a
position to take bold decisions. But they can set
new directions in the management of the Greek
debt crisis by:
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4. See Ruscher and Wolff
(2010).
5. European Commission
(2010b).
6. Marzinotto (2011).
• Lowering the interest rate on official assis-
tance to the lowest economically-possible
level.
• Committing politically to make the financial
sector pay for any public finance resulting
from official assistance to Greece.
• Request from the EFSF support for an immedi-
ate bond buy-back programme (and agree on
changes to the EFSF/ESM mandate).
• Request from the ESRB an immediate evalua-
tion of the risks to financial stability involved
in a future restructuring of euro-area sovereign
debt, and proposals for mitigating the risks.
2 DEVISE A GROWTH STRATEGY
To secure the solvency of Greece, debt relief is only
a temporary fix. More fundamentally, a serious
growth revival programme needs to be put in
place. A number of fundamental problems need to
be addressed: 
• First, Greek banks are in a precarious state,
having suffered losses on their loan portfolio,
and they are massively exposed to sovereign
default risks. The recent stress tests have indi-
cated that their holdings of sovereign bonds
are twice as high as their core Tier-1 capital. In
these conditions Greek banks are cut off from
access to market liquidity and are subject to
deposit withdrawals (IMF projects deposits at
end-June 2011 to be 15 percent below June
2010 level). 
• Second, domestic demand has fallen dramat-
ically as a consequence of the ongoing adjust-
ment. Year-on-year growth of domestic
demand was -10 percent in the first quarter of
2011, contributing in a major way to GDP
decline (-6 percent in 2011Q1) and to the rise
in unemployment. Leverage remains high and
balance-sheet adjustment is only starting and
is likely to last for a decade4. Continued reces-
sion threatens the achievement of fiscal objec-
tives and the political sustainability of the
adjustment. 
• Third, Greece is not competitive. European
Commission estimates suggest that the real
effective exchange rate was overvalued by up
to 20 percent in 20085. Competitiveness has
improved since, thanks to nominal wage
adjustment (-6 percent year-on-year at end-
March 2011) but the productivity cycle limits
reductions in unit labour costs. Greece in the
coming years needs to channel capital and
labour to the traded-goods sector and this
requires a depreciation of the real exchange
rate. The more front-loaded this depreciation
can be, the more promising it is for adjustment
and the revival of sustainable growth.
Immediate action should be taken to address
these challenges. To strengthen the banks, money
in the current EU/International Monetary Fund pro-
grammes earmarked for the banking system
needs to be used and possibly topped-up to
ensure the Greek banking system is sufficiently
capitalised to provide credit. At the same time, the
EU should encourage the takeover of Greek banks
by foreign banks. To support domestic demand
and give Greece a chance to grow, the short term
pace of fiscal adjustment should be slowed. But
immediate fixes will not be enough. 
Greece needs an economic strategy to comple-
ment the structural reforms introduced within the
framework of the EU-IMF programme, foster pro-
ductivity and reorient the economy towards exter-
nal demand. EU leaders should therefore provide
support to an economic revival strategy that
encompasses a Greek economic revival fund
which will be used for four priorities.
a) A Greek economic revival fund
There is no scarcity of financial means for a
growth-revival strategy. Under the current EU mul-
tiannual financial framework 2007-13, Greece still
has more than €12 billion in unused funds, in
other words more than 5 percent of GDP. Moreover,
the available funds could be used to leverage EIB
loans, for which Greece has applied relatively less
than other southern European countries6. Assum-
ing one third of the unused funds is used to
finance EIB-like projects in energy, transport and
telecommunications, and EIB loans finance 50
percent of each project’s total costs, as standard,
the potential size of the growth fund available for
the 2011-13 period would increase to €16 billion
or about 7 percent of GDP. These far from trivial
numbers would not involve any additional trans-
fer to Greece beyond what has been already ear-
marked in the EU budget.
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7. Some funds may be al-
ready allocated through the
JEREMIE programme with-
out the need for special leg-
islation. JEREMIE is an ini-
tiative by the Commission
and the European Invest-
ment Fund through which
Structural Funds are paid
up-front to support small
and medium enterprises
(SMEs) and their most in-
novative projects. The funds
are typically collected in a
holding fund and managed
by selected financial inter-
mediaries. With the advan-
tage that EU payments are
made up-front comes also
the fact that financial inter-
mediaries and possibly
even the EIB are involved in
the evaluation and monitor-
ing of the projects, soften-
ing concerns about poor
governance.
8. European Commission
(2010a).
9. If the activities in R&D
sectors are conducted by
SMEs, subsidies may be
financed by Structural
Funds through the JEREMIE
programme (eg €2 billion)
and thus implemented
almost immediately and in
a flexible setting.
Early disbursement of the funds that have already
been allocated to Greece at the beginning of the
financial framework needs to be secured. The
Commission should propose special legislation to
reallocate to a Greek economic revival fund
uncommitted Structural and Cohesion Funds ear-
marked for Greece within the framework of the
2007-2013 financial perspective. This Fund
should be used to support the growth and com-
petitiveness components of the EU-IMF pro-
gramme; its priorities should be decided within
the framework of this programme. Legislation to
this end should be adopted urgently by the Coun-
cil and the European Parliament, so that it is effec-
tive before year-end7.
Of course the delivery of these funds matters.
Structural Funds in the past have rarely fostered
sustained growth. They have mainly been used for
investment into physical infrastructure which was
initially necessary but eventually fuelled con-
struction booms. Moreover, the co-funding mech-
anism created political rents and also outright
corruption. Future disbursements will therefore
have to address the issue of the governance of
funds as well as their use. In the following, we sug-
gest four specific destinations for funds, with €4
billion allocated to each over the 2011-13 period. 
b) A programme to increase the quality of higher
education
Prior to the crisis, the quality of education was
identified as an serious impediment to Greek
growth. There is now a risk that budgetary adjust-
ment will result in further deterioration in the qual-
ity of the higher education system. €4 billion from
the Revival Fund should be allocated to financing
institutions of excellence, providing means-tested
scholarships and financing mobility programmes. 
c) An internal devaluation
Greece needs to export more goods and services.
The Greek manufacturing sector is relatively small
by European standards but was not subject to the
same dramatic downsizing seen in the rest of the
euro area over the last decade. Nevertheless, Euro-
pean Commission research has shown that a large
proportion of Greek corporations already have
some export basis8. In terms of services, tourism
is a prime price-elastic export industry. Fixed
costs for exporting are thus low and a marginal
improvement in price competitiveness could
quickly benefit exports. 
Reducing labour costs in the tradable sector
should thus be prioritised. Eventually this reduc-
tion will come from the wage-and-price adjust-
ment process at a limited cost to the
wage-earners (because the whole price system
will have adjusted), but the short-term cost could
be high for employees whose wages adjust first.
The Economic Revival Fund should be used to
smooth this adjustment.
The combined wage bill of the manufacturing and
hotel and restaurants sectors – a reasonable
approximation of the tradable sector – amounts to
€11 billion. €4 billion from the economic revival
fund should be earmarked for temporary wage
subsidies in these sectors, to be introduced on 1
January 2012 and phased out during 2013-15.
These subsidies should serve to front-load the
reduction of labour costs while offsetting part of
the cost to employees, and foster the internal
devaluation process. Some wage subsidies might
more specifically target R&D-intensive sectors to
boost their growth potential, reverse the brain
drain, help attract back Greek nationals living
abroad, and prepare the ground for an upgrading
of value chains9. 
In order to avoid wage-cost reductions being cap-
tured by rents, the internal devaluation will need
to be accompanied by strong measures to reduce
market power and foster competition. It will there-
fore be imperative that the European Commission,
with national competition authorities, uses all
available instruments to foster competition and
reduce rents. For example, reducing administra-
tive burdens on firms to allow entry by reducing
‘The Commission should propose special legislation to reallocate to a Greek economic revival
fund uncommitted Structural and Cohesion Funds earmarked for Greece within the framework of
the 2007-2013 financial perspective.’
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10. Hausmann (2011).
11. The EIB provides credit
lines to national finan-
cial intermediaries to
finance these types of
initiatives, or Structural
Funds can be utilised
under the umbrella of
the JEREMIE programme
(see note 7).
12. The case for such inter-
vention is made in
Aghion et al (2011).
13. See Hildago et al
(2007).
legal requirements would be a first important step
in the direction of changing the domestic com-
petitive environment. Indeed, these types of
measures also have the merit of having quite
immediate strong macroeconomic effects.
d) Enterprise support to foster the upgrading of
production and exports
Economies grow by upgrading the products they
already produce and by producing new products.
Given a certain knowledge set, it is easier to
upgrade to similar products than to completely dif-
ferent ones. Greece has high potential for upgrad-
ing. Hausmann (2011) finds that Greece could
expand its manufacturing of agricultural machin-
ery and appliances, metal-forming machine tools
and dairy machinery, and electric equipment for
internal combustion engines and special textile
products10. For the process to succeed, the most
innovative firms and small and medium start-ups
need to have access to finance11. This is even
more urgent in a situation in which weakened
banks might restrict access to credit. €4 billion
from the economic revival fund should be redi-
rected to providing credit for SMEs and capital for
investment in the production of new products.
Public support should be provided on a competi-
tive basis to sectors that have the highest poten-
tial for fostering efficiency12. 
e) 'Lighthouse' innovation projects
Greece needs a greater variety of products and
high added-value production if it is to substan-
tially increase exports and income. However, such
advancement to new technological levels is
unlikely13. A further €4 billion should be devoted
earmarked to support a programme in this field.
The economic revival fund should be earmarked
to foster the creation of several local centres of
innovation that combining centres of academic
excellence with special business zones to allow
for technological spin-offs. Relying on local uni-
versities only will however not be enough to foster
synergies. Instead, high ranking research institu-
tions in the rest of Europe (such as Oxford Univer-
sity or the Max Planck Society) should be provided
with a financial incentive to set up campuses in
Greece. The university subsidiary should focus on
a few selected key areas (for example bio-tech-
nology or green technology). Independent man-
agement of the subsidiary should ensure
excellence at a global level by avoiding influence
from other parties and being able to attract global
top researchers with attractive salaries. Such aca-
demic centres of excellence could be the nucleus
of a new growth centre. For example, Greece’s
strong renewable potential is in danger of being
under-utilised. 
This economic revival programme has a strong
interventionist flavour. The reason for this is that
as long as the price system delivers wrong signals
– because of the price distortions accumulated in
the first decade of monetary union and the time it
takes to correct them – horizontal measures alone
cannot be expected to trigger the necessary shift
of resources towards the tradable sector. Without
specific incentives, resource allocation is bound
to remain distorted as long as prices are wrong.
Moreover, there is significant evidence that strong
incentives are needed to foster innovation and
technological change. These considerations
underpin the industrial policy approach we are
advocating. 
However, financial incentives by themselves will
not be enough.  Institutions fostering entrepre-
neurship and research need to be improved. The
rule of law, a corruption-free environment and effi-
cient state apparatus are key determinants of
innovation and investment. The European funds
should therefore be conditional on improving the
institutional environment.  
In sum, early and targeted disbursement of EU
grants does not guarantee that resources will be
efficiently managed. Yet, fixing the priorities and
coordinating structural reform interventions with
EU-IMF authorities would be a necessary and
‘Relying on local universities only will however not be enough to foster synergies. Instead, high-
ranking research institutions in the rest of Europe should be provided with a financial incentive
to set up campuses in Greece.’
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14. See Véron (2011).
15. Pisani-Ferry (2011).
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Figure 1: Banking-sector exposure to the
domestic sovereign in the EU
Source: Bruegel based on EBA stress tests.
decisive step towards efficient management of
the available resources. 
3 INITIATE SYSTEMIC REFORMS TO REDUCE
FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
Fixing the Greek case is an absolute priority but
European leaders should also initiate broader
euro-area reforms and devise mechanisms to pre-
vent contagion. The recent speculative attacks on
Italy and Spain have demonstrated the inherent
fragility of the euro area.    
The correlation of banking crises and sovereign
crises has been a distinctive feature of recent tur-
moil in the euro area. It has been manifest in the
Greek, Irish and Spanish cases, though the direc-
tion of the causation is not the same for different
countries. Recent market reactions to the bank
stress tests indicate that the phenomenon may
affect other countries, not least Italy. This repre-
sents a threat for the future, endangers the stabil-
ity of the financial system, and makes bank runs
more likely. 
FIgure 1, on the basis of the recent stress test
results, provides a good indication of where each
national banking system stands in terms of vul-
nerability. The vertical axis shows the exposure
ratio of own-country public debt domestic banks’
exposure to their own country’s public debt rela-
tively toto core Tier 1 capital for all domestic banks
surveyed in the recent stress test exercise. This
ratio is indicative of the potential repercussions of
a country’s sovereign debt crisis on its own banks.
The horizontal axis shows the exposure to ratio of
own-country public debt relatively domestic
banks’ exposure to their own country’s public debt
to total public debt. It measures the share of
losses they would bear in case of a sovereign debt
crisis in their country. 
Figure 1 indicates that that in many countries
banks are excessively exposed to threats to the
solvency of their own sovereign, and this is a
major weakness of the euro area. When this
solvency is called into question, banks are imme-
diately affected because of their direct exposure
and because the of the sovereign’s diminished
ability to come to their rescue. This vulnerability
soon shows up in stock-market depreciations,
credit-default valuations, credit spreads and, pos-
sibly, bank runs. This in turn weakens further the
situation of the sovereign, because of expecta-
tions of bank rescue costs.
This vicious circle must be broken. Sovereigns
should be better protected against the failure of
their banks, through the centralisation of supervi-
sion and the mutualisation of deposit insurance.
An immediate response could be for the EFSF to
explicitly guarantee all euro-area national deposit-
insurance schemes14. Such a measure, however,
would also require a significant stepping up of the
supervisory powers of the centre, to align incen-
tives and avoid moral hazard. The European Bank-
ing Authority could be given such additional power.
To complement this, banks should be better pro-
tected against the failure of their sovereigns,
through diversification of their bond portfolios.
This can be achieved through setting regulatory
ratios; alternatively, it is also the most potent jus-
tification for introducing Eurobonds, because they
would offer a natural diversification instrument15. 
In the same way that they initiated reforms of the
‘In many countries banks are excessively exposed to threats to the solvency of their own
sovereign, and this is a major weakness of the euro area. When this solvency is called into
question, banks are immediately affected.’
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euro-area surveillance system in 2009-10, the EU
leaders should call upon the President of the Euro-
pean Council and the European Commission to
prepare proposals in this field.
CONCLUSION
The euro area’s leaders cannot be expected to
solve lingering problems by the stroke of a pen.
They cannot be expected either to find unanimous
agreement in fields in which they have had con-
sistently different positions. But they can demon-
strate initiative by addressing three concerns
simultaneously: sovereign solvency, growth, and
systemic fragility. A meaningful package is within
reach. This opportunity should not be missed. Our
proposal is an immediate action plan but more
ambitious reforms will be necessary.
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